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The paper presents a theory of policy timing that relies on uncertainty and transaction costs to 
explain the optimal timing and length of policy reforms. Delaying reforms resolves some 
uncertainty by gaining valuable information and saves transaction costs. Implementing reforms 
without waiting increases welfare by adjusting domestic policies to changed market 
parameters. Optimal policy timing is found by balancing the trade-off between delaying 
reforms and implementing reforms without waiting. Our theory offers an explanation of why 
countries differ with respect to the length of their policy reforms, and why applied studies often 
judge agricultural policies to be inefficient.  
 




Whenever a government makes a policy decision, it ultimately has to decide on three distinct 
issues: the choice of policy instruments, the setting of the levels of these instruments, and the 
timing of their implementation. In theoretical and applied policy analysis, the time dimension 
of policy formation is often ignored or simply taken as an occurrence exogenous to the rest of 
the policy formation process. The aim of this paper is to consider the timing of policy as an 
integral part of the process, explicitly chosen by government. In particular, we draw insights 
from transaction cost economics and from developments in the theory of decision making 
under temporal revelation of information, and incorporate those insights into a political 
economy model.  
The central element of our theory is that government balances the costs of delaying policy 
reforms against the benefits. Costs are in the form of welfare losses, brought about by delayed 
adjustment to changes in the economic and political environment. Benefits of delaying policy 
reforms stem from receiving better information by waiting, and by delaying costs of the 
political process that accompany policy changes. In a world in which no further information is 
revealed over time and without costs of setting or changing policy, government would set an 
optimal policy and never change it. In a world in which new information, e.g. world market 
prices, is continuously revealed over time but negotiation costs and other costs of policy 
change are zero, government would change policy every time it receives additional information 
and hence very often. However, in the real world we observe neither situation, but rather 
observe governments changing policies discretely. 
In our model, the value of waiting for information and the costs of policy change balance in 
political economic equilibrium, and result in intermittent policy change. Our analysis shares 
much with the option value part of the investment literature, except that we do not require 
irreversibility of policies. Instead we allow policies to change back and forth, but we still 
incorporate the concept of irreversible costs of policy change. We derive testable theoretical 
results from the model that could be further developed and investigated.  
Although the setup of our model is fairly simple, the analytical solutions are quite complex 
and not necessarily tractable. By using data related to a reform of the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in 1992, we were able to create numerical illustrations of our general results. We 
also contribute to the literature that seeks to explain the rationale behind the 1992 reform 
(Mahe and Roe 1996; Kay 1998; 2003; Daugbjerg, 1999; 2003) by explaining how the timing 
of policy change relies on irreversible transaction costs, i.e., that once a reform was made, it 
would have been quite costly to reverse.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the main ideas 
of our theory of policy timing. Section 3 uses data from around the 1992 CAP-reform to   3
analyze and illustrate the model with a numerical simulation. Section 4 presents the main 
results of our simulations. Section 5 concludes with a discussion. 
 
 
2. Theory of policy timing 
Our theory of policy timing relies on the concepts of option value and the transaction costs of 
the political process. When decisions are made under uncertainty, and when more and better 
information arrives over time, having the ability to wait before making a decision has value. 
This value is commonly called the option value in the finance literature (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994) or the quasi-option value in the environmental economics literature (Arrow and Fisher 
1974; Smith 1983; Kolstad 1996). 
The issue of optimal timing is far from new to the economics profession and typically arises 
in decision-making under uncertainty and involves irreversibilities and sunk costs as in Arrow 
and Fisher (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1990) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Numerous 
studies in various fields have attempted to capture timing aspects of policy-making. Pindyck 
(2002) studies optimal timing problems in environmental economics. Szymanski (1991) 
addresses similar issues with regard to infrastructure investment. Aoki (2003) and Taylor 
(1993) analyze those aspects in monetary policy. Stern (2007) and Gerlagh et al. (2009) 
provide examples from economic research related to climate change.  
The literature on optimal timing problems frequently regards policy change to be 
irreversible (e.g., Pindyck 2002). This assumption seems strong. By their very nature, policies 
can shift back and forth, and policy-makers frequently make use of this by regularly 
introducing, changing, removing, and re-introducing policies. For decisions to be made in the 
political arena, most nations have in place institutions that facilitate the meeting and bargaining 
of varying interest groups or their representatives. There is a growing literature that analyzes 
the costs of social interaction in general (e.g., Williamson 1985), and the costs of making 
economic policy in particular (Dixit 1996). These transaction costs include the costs associated 
with searching for information, bargaining, making contracts, enforcing contracts, and 
protecting property rights (Eggertsson 1990). Our focus is on negotiation costs, such as costs 
associated with meeting and bargaining (the legislators’ salaries, travel costs, other 
administrative costs, etc). There are also the costs of preparation for those meetings, when 
agents gather information on policy issues and policy alternatives, and conduct ex-ante 
evaluation of the economic and social consequences of those alternatives. In this sense, though 
it brings about obvious benefits, the whole political process of debating issues, lobbying, voters 
keeping themselves informed, etc., is costly. We maintain that this costliness of meeting and 
bargaining affects how often legislatures meet, how often elections are held, and how often 
major pieces of policy legislation are passed. It is this cost which keeps governments from 
finely tuning policies on a day-by-day basis. We therefore suggest a conceptual theory of 
policy timing that allows for flexibility in changing policies back and forth, but requires 
irreversible negotiation costs whenever a policy change takes place.  
There are other costs to policies and policy change that lie beyond the focus of this paper. 
There may be costs of adjustment as producers, consumers and taxpayers change their 
decisions in line with the new policies. For decisions that have long-lasting effects, e.g. 
investments, adjustment costs may be of particular importance to decision makers. We abstract 





3.1 Theoretical  model 
Consider a government that is able to change policy once per period if it so desires. At each 
period t = 1, …, T the government makes final decisions and provisional decisions. It makes a   4 
final decision on whether to meet in period t, and it makes a final decision on period t’s policy. 
If it decides not to meet in t, then changing t’s policy is infinitely expensive, and therefore 
government will also decide not to change policy. Also in period t, government makes 
provisional decisions about meetings and policies for future years. We let 
tmr be a variable 
representing the plan made in period t about meeting in period r ≥ t. If r > t, then the meeting 
plan made in period t for period r is provisional. If r = t, then we have 
tmt, a variable 
representing the final decision made in period t about whether to meet in period t. In all cases, 
setting 
tmr to one means that the plan made in period t is to meet in period r, and setting 
tmr to 
zero means that the plan made in period t is to not meet in period r. Similarly, 
tar is a vector of 
policy instruments, which are variables.
1 When 
tar is assigned a value, it represents the policy 
planned in period t to be enacted in period r. If r > t, then the policy plan is provisional. If r = t, 
then the policy plan is final.  
Utility obtained by group i in period r is uir, which depends on 
rmr (i.e., on whether a 
meeting is held in period r), on 
rar (the policy set in period r), on 
r-1ar-1 (the policy that was set 
in period r-1), on r (the world price in period r), and on br, which describes the exogenous 




r1ar1,br,r   
Current utility thus depends on current decisions and past decisions, i.e., on the policy that was 
set in the previous period, through the formulation of the negotiation cost function, which will 
be explained in detail below. In a generic year t {1, … , T}, the optimization problem for the 









taT) to maximize the expected value of the discounted 
weighted sum of future interest group welfare. This expected value is conditioned on the 
current value of the world price, t, so the government’s problem is, 
 






















,    (1) 
 
where ρ ≤ 1 is a discount factor, and uir is i’s welfare obtained in period r. To keep notation 
compact, we let 
tat-1 = 
t-1at-1. That is, at t, the “decision” about the previous year’s policy has 
already been made, so the “decision” made in t for the policy in t-1 is just the decision that was 
made in t-1 about the policy in t-1. Expectations are taken over the future periods’ world 
prices, t+1, …, T, given that the value of the current world price t has been revealed and is 
known. Heikkinen and Pietola (2009) present a similar model, in which a firm makes flexible 
investments in each time period t = 1, …, T, but maximizes the expected value of its 
investment over a period of infinite horizon, capturing the investment’s effect on all future 
periods. On the contrary, in our model governments annually decide whether to change 
policies.  
For illustrative purposes and to simplify the calculations, we switch in the remainder of this 
paper from the general model presented in (1) to a specific version. We assume two interest 
groups (n = 2) and three time periods (T = 3). Our focus is on one commodity market (the 
wheat market), and on one policy instrument a, the wheat intervention price. There is one 
stochastic variable, the wheat world price, denoted by βt. We assume that βt enters linearly in 
the empirical application and in (3) below. Wheat producers and non-wheat producers are 
indexed by s and c, respectively. We assume further that there are negotiation costs, which are 
made up of a fixed component (travel costs, housing costs etc.) and a variable component 
                                                 
1   Our modeling of policies and policy instruments follows several examples in the literature, 
including HARSANYI (1963), (1977), ZUSMAN (1976), GARDNER (1983), and BULLOCK, 
SALHOFER, AND KOLA (1999).    5
(negotiators’ labor costs, etc.). For a generic year t, negotiation costs are a function of whether 



















   (2) 
 
In (2), f denotes the fixed part of the negotiation costs, while parameter γ > 0 determines 
how costs increase with the size of the (square of the) policy change. Policy instruments 
tat and 
t-1at-1 represent a price support policy variable in periods t and t-1, and are denoted in million 
euros per ton. For example, if γ = 0.25, then a price change of 20 €/ton would give a variable 
negotiation cost of 100 €. The greater changes in policy, the more costly it is to implement the 
policy. A simple justification would be that the debate takes longer, so the opportunity costs of 
the time spent at the meeting increase. The parameter ξ > 0 is assumed to be very large and has 
the effect of making policy change prohibitively costly if no meeting is held (
tmt = 0).  
Both negotiation costs and the monetary expenditures made by government to implement its 
policies are paid by the interest groups according to their shares of the population, δs and δc. 
We bring uncertainty into the model by assuming that, in any period t, at the time the 
government’s decisions are made, only the level of the previous year’s world price, βt-1 is 
known. In any year the world price can either rise or fall: βt+1 = βt + ∆H, or βt+1 = βt + ∆L, 
where ∆H > 0 and ∆L < 0. We assume that the price goes down in year 1 with probability π
D, 
and goes up with probability π
U = 1-π
D. Similarly, the world price falls in all three periods with 
probability  π
DDD, and rises in all three periods probability π
UUU. Assuming that price 

















In period 1, the government’s planned choice schedule is a set of strategy variables, two of 






1a3}. If the government 
chooses 
1m1 = 1, then it meets in the first period. If it sets 
1m1 = 0, then it does not meet in that 
period. Say that the policy in the period before period 1 was set at some level 
0a0. If there is a 
first-period meeting, the government sets a policy 
1a1. The government’s provisional decision 
in period 1 about whether to meet in period 2 is 
1m2, and the provisional policy set in period 1 
for period 2 is 
1a2. Note that the government’s own actions influence the information that it 
possesses about future market prices. Information about the world market price in period t-1 is 
always revealed in t. A government that wants to use information about the world market price 
in  t-1 can do so by deciding to meet in period t. This government, however, then faces 
negotiation costs. Government will choose to wait for better information if the expected value 
of this information gain more than offsets the costs of meeting.  




1m3) represent the government’s planned meeting 
schedule as of period 1. The set of possible planned meeting schedules is M, and it has eight 
elements: M = {m1, … , m8}. The first possible strategy is to set m1 = {1, 1, 1}, meaning that 
meetings are planned to be held in every period; the second is to set m2 = {1, 1, 0}, meaning 
that meetings are planned to be held in the first two periods but not in the third; continuing in 
this manner, the eighth possible strategy is to set m8 = {0, 0, 0}, meaning that no meetings are 
held in any period. When a meeting schedule is planned, only the plan about whether to have a 
first-period meeting is committed and unalterable; 
1m2 and 
1m3 are provisionally planned, and 
may be changed in future periods. In period 2, government has no real choice anymore about 
meeting and policy in period 1; so period 2’s plan for period 1 is the same as the actions taken 




1m1). Given this choice from period 1, government solves the 




2m3) that maximize (1) 
conditioned on the previous choice (
1a1, 
1m1). Similarly, when period 3 arrives, government 
must take its past decisions as given, which means in our framework that it sets (
3a1, 
3m1) to   6 
equal its past choice (
1a1, 
1m1), and similarly (
3a2, 
3m2) to equal its past choice (
2a2, 






















tmt,  , where 
CS
tar,br   Dp ,br 
tar

 dp is consumer surplus, PS
tar,br   Sp ,b 
0
tar
 dp is producer 

























 represents negotiation 
costs. The other parameters are explained earlier in this article.  











tar1,b,r     












.    (3) 
 
Note that βt is random, but enters linearly in the government welfare function. This allows us to 
replace all βr terms by their expected values in period t, E{βr| βt}.  
To solve (3), consider the first period, which is when government makes final choices 
1m1 
and 




1a3. Assuming linear supply and demand 
functions




















































































 k0  k11   k2
1m1 
1 a0
 k0  k12 
















    (4) 
 
with  k0  cc0 sb0  b0  c0   ,  k1   b1  c1  ,  k2
tmt   
tmt,b  ,  k3
tmt,
tmt1   = 
cc1 sb1   2 b1  c1  
tmt,b   
tmt1,b        ,  k3last
tm3   =  cc1 sb1   – 
 2 b1  c1  
tmt,b   
tmt1,b     , and k4
tmt   
tmt,b  , where  s s c c         
and      m m    1 2 2 .  
For any meeting plan 
1m  M, (4) gives the optimal first-period support price as a function 
of the meeting plan: 
 a1
1m  . As 
1mt is a binary variable, the optimal support price in period 1, 
called 
1a1
*, is found by selecting the action 
1m
* that results in highest expected payoff when (4) 
is plugged back into (3): 
                                                 
2   S(p, b) = b0 + b1 p, D(p, b) = c0 + c1 p   7
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Note that when decision 
1m









are made only provisionally, and may be changed in the future. Finally, the optimal policy in 
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all are given. 
 
3.2 Empirical  application 
We illustrate our model by using data for the 1992 CAP-reform, the main policy change of 
which was a considerable reduction in the cereals intervention prices (partly) compensated by 
direct area payments and other accompanying measures. As our focus is on the value of 
delaying policy reforms, we assume that the EU could have implemented the 1992 CAP-reform 
in 1982, 1986 and, as it did, in 1991. We chose 1980/81 as our base year.  
We calculated the EU wheat producer price as the unweighted average German and French 
wheat producer price for 1980/81 (FAO 2009), which was 219.94 €/ton. Usable production and 
internal use were 56.4 million tons and 44.9 million tons, respectively (EU-Commission 1989). 
We assumed 0.3277 as the own-price elasticity of wheat supply (Guoymard et al. 1996) and -
0.270 as the own-price elasticity of wheat demand (Sullivan et al. 1989).  
The initial world price was defined as the US wheat producer price 1980/81, which was β0 = 
146.44 €/ton (FAO 2009). The development of the world price until 1991 was based on the 
assumption that future prices could vary as much as they did in the 15 years before 1980/81. 
The two possible movements in the world price were set to ∆H = 18 €/ton and ∆L = – 22 €/ton. 
Within three periods time, the world price could reach a maximum of β
UUU = 200.44 €/ton and 
a minimum of β
DDD = 80.44 €/ton. The probability of a rise (fall) in the world price was π
U = 
0.65 (π
D = 0.35), indicating an expectation of an upward shift of the world price. The 
population share of non-wheat producers (i.e. consumers) and wheat producers was calculated 
based on the number of cereal farms in 1980/81, assuming four persons per holding: δc = 
0.9967 and δs = 0.0033. The discount rate was set at 5 percent, ρ = 0.95.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no attempt in the literature to empirically measure the 
transaction costs of policy-making, although the influence of transaction costs on (economic) 
policy-making is widely acknowledged (Dixit 1996) As initial values, we use γ = 0.25, f = 1, 
and ξ = 100,000,000, which is a “technical” parameter that is assumed high enough to prevent 
government from changing the policy when not meeting.  
To help keep our focus on policy timing, we employed the very simple political economy 
model sometimes called the political preference function approach, based on Rausser and 
Freebairn (1974) to obtain estimates of our model’s interest group weights, αs and αc. As 
argued by Bullock (1994, p. 35), this approach assumes “observed policies [to be] efficient”, 
and “the number of policy instruments to be exactly one less than the number of interest 
groups.” In our model we assume political-economic equilibrium in the base-year, i.e. that (β0, 
m0) = (219.94, 1). In equilibrium, αc = 0.4572 and αs = 0.5428, which implies that wheat 
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4. Numerical results 
4.1  The length of a policy reform 
The length of a policy reform is generally defined as starting with period r in which a 
government has decided to meet, and ending with the first period s > r in which government 
decides to meet next. Its length is given by s - r. Assume government has met in t1 (m1 = 1) and 
t3 (m3 = 1), but not in t2 (m2 = 0). There are two policy reforms in this example. The first policy 
reform starts in t1 and lasts for 3 - 1 = 2 periods. The second policy reform starts in t3 and lasts 
for one period. The maximal length of a policy reform in our model is four periods, because we 
assume government to have met in the period immediately preceding the first period.  
The optimal length of a policy reform is endogenous and given by the solution to (3). The 
first order conditions (4) indicate how the length of a policy reform is affected by changes in 
exogenous parameters. As the analytical solution to (4) is quite complex, numerical illustration 
is provided to yield insights.  
An increase in the parameters f and  of the negotiation cost function increase the length of 
the policy reform as it becomes more costly to change policy. Figure 1 shows the optimal 
meeting strategy at t = 1 as a function of the parameters of the negotiation cost function, f  [0, 
6] and   [0, 2.5], and for the given random walk of the world price. The contour lines in 
figure 1 demarcate the areas in which four of the eight possible meeting strategies are optimal. 
They have been drawn by calculating the optimal meeting strategy for each possible pair of {f, 
}.  
 
Figure 1. Optimal meeting plan {m1, m2, m3} in t1 in {γ, f} – space 
 
Within the range of the parameter values in figure 1, the optimal plan is, as expected, to 
meet in every period {1, 1, 1} if fixed costs and variable costs are low enough. As variable 
costs increase (holding fixed costs constant), the number of meetings is reduced starting with 
meetings in later periods, until {0, 0, 0} finally becomes the optimal meeting strategy (not 
shown in figure 1). For f = 1, {0, 0, 0} will be optimal for  > 170. A similar result occurs when 
fixed costs increase (holding marginal costs constant). Fewer meetings are held. Meeting 
strategy {1, 0, 1} is chosen over {1, 1, 0} only when  = 0 and f is sufficiently low. In the area 
{0,0,0} 
{1,0,1}  {1,1,0} 
{1,0,0} 
{1,1,1}   9
to the right of and above the upper-right contour in figure 1, the optimal meeting plan is not to 
meet in any period, which is {0, 0, 0}.
3  
It turns out that none of the meeting strategies that include not meeting in the first, but 
meeting in the second, third, or both periods is optimal under these conditions. This result 
depends heavily on the parameterization of the random walk of the world price. Figure 2 is 
identical to figure 1, with the exception that the expected change in the world market price in t3 
has been doubled, i.e., β3 = β2 + 2∆H, and β3= β2 + 2∆L. As a result, meeting strategy {0, 0, 1} 





Figure 2. Optimal meeting plan {m1, m2, m3} in {γ ,f} – space with twice the expected change in 
world price in t3  
 
Increased variance of the world market price development in t3 makes it more valuable to 
meet in that period. By comparing figure 2 with figure 1, we can also infer that meeting 
strategies {1, 0, 1} and {1, 1, 1} become optimal for a wider range of the parameters of the 
negotiation costs function. But still, when negotiation costs reach a sufficiently high level, not 
meeting (i.e., {0, 0, 0}) becomes the optimal meeting strategy.  
 
4.2  Size of policy change  
The size of the policy change, at – at-1, depends on several of the model’s parameters. An 
increase in the marginal meeting costs, γ, reduces the size, as more resources go into the 
political process instead of increasing welfare. A change in the fixed meeting costs does not 
impact the size of the policy change. However the size of the policy change does depend on the 
strength of the external shock that is applied; the larger the change in the political and 
economic conditions (i.e. the change in the world price in our model), the larger will be the 
                                                 
3   A mean-preserving change in the variance does not alter the optimal policy plan. This is 






{1,1,0}   10 
policy change. This is true both for current and future policy decisions, and independent of 
whether the change is in the current period or in future periods. Moreover, the size of the 
policy change depends on the length of a policy reform. The longer the period without a 
reform, the larger will be the policy change both at the time the new policy is implemented as 
well as the next time the government accomplishes a new reform. Table 1 illustrates by 
comparing optimal policies for different meeting scenarios at t = 1.  
 
Table 1. Optimal policies a1, a2 and a3 at t1 for different meeting scenarios [€/t] 
  a0 A 1 a 1 - a0 a 2 a 2 - a1 a 3 a 3 - a2 a 3 - a0 
{0, 0, 1}  219.94  219.94  0.00  219.94 0.00 222.61 2.67 2.67 
{0, 1, 1}  219.94  219.94  0.00  223.24 3.30 225.25 2.01 5.31 
{1, 0, 0}  219.94  223.58  3.63  223.58 0.00 223.58 0.00 3.63 
{1, 0, 1}  219.94  223.31  3.37  223.31 0.00 225.30 1.99 5.36 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Examining table 1, comparing scenario {0, 0, 1} with scenario {0, 1, 1}, the change from t = 
2 to t = 3 as measured by a3 – a2 is larger for the former scenario where no meeting was held 
until t = 3 (2.67 €/t), than the latter scenario where a meeting was held in t = 2 (2.01 €/t). 
Similarly, the change from t = 0 to t = 1 as measured by a1 – a0 is larger for the scenario {1, 0, 
0}, where no meeting is held after t = 1 than for the scenario {1, 0, 1}, where a new meeting is 
held in t = 3. These results do not imply, however, that the total policy change over the 
observed time period will be larger. Total policy change as measured by a3 – a0 is 5.31 €/t in 
scenario {0, 1, 1} compared to 2.67 €/t in scenario {0, 0, 1}. The same holds for scenarios {1, 
0, 1} and {1, 0, 0}.  
 
4.3  Efficiency of seemingly inefficient policies  
Following the seminal work of Stigler (1982), Becker (1983) and Gardner (1983), a long-
standing debate in agricultural economics considers whether government redistribution is 
efficient. Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to support or question this 
hypothesis (Bullock 1995) and the references therein). But those models frequently do not 
account for the costs of policy change, and so bear the risk of erroneously finding observed 
policies to be inefficient. To see why, compare the optimal response of the domestic policy a1 
to a change in the world price from β0 to β1 for the cases with and without negotiation costs. 
Intuitively, for a given β1, the change in the domestic policy will be higher without negotiation 
costs. A positive policy analysis neglecting negotiation costs would thus observe a domestic 
policy different from what the model would predict, and erroneously judge that policy to be 
inefficient. Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration.  
The solid (dotted) line in figure 3 depicts the optimal response policy a1 with (without) 
negotiation costs. The two lines intersect at the point (a0, β0) = (219.94, 146.44), as no change 
in the world price does not require a change in the domestic price either. The grey shaded area 
between the two lines indicates the price range of the domestic price for a given change in the 
world price for which a political economy model neglecting negotiation costs would find the 
observed domestic policy a1 to be inefficient. Consider point A which is approximately (140, 
70) in figure 3. Without negotiation costs, a domestic price of 140 €/t would be the optimal 
response to a world price of 70 €/t. However, taking negotiation costs into account and   11
assuming (a0, β0) = (219.94, 146.44) from the previous period, the optimal policy would be at 
point B, approximately (220, 70). A political economy analysis that neglects negotiation costs 
would find the observed policy a1 ≈ 220 €/t to be inefficient (i.e., too high) as it would assume 
policy a1 ≈ 140 €/t to be optimal policy given the market parameters and the world price. This 
is because negotiation costs reduce the benefits of changing policies and thus reduce the size of 
the optimal policy response. The price range increases with an increase of the change in the 





































Figure 3. Price range for seemingly inefficient policies 
 
Note that the optimal response function without negotiation costs has a steeper slope than 
the optimal response function with negotiation costs. In addition, the latter function is flat 
around (a0, β0). This is because in this neighborhood, the change in the world price from β0 to 
β1 is too small to outweigh the costs of domestic policy change. Therefore, government 
chooses to keep the former policy a0.  
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents a theory of policy timing based on the cost-benefit trade-offs. On the one 
hand, there are benefits to adjusting quickly to changes in the economic and political 
environment. On the other hand, there are benefits of waiting for valuable information, and 
there are negotiation costs of policy change, as well. The theory is incorporated into a dynamic 
political economy model in which a government has full flexibility with regard to the design 
and length of a policy reform. Improving upon existing literature, the model does not require 
the irreversibility of policies themselves, but assumes instead the irreversibility of the costs of 
changing policies. The theory yields some interesting insights. It makes a contribution to the 
question of why countries adopt policy reforms of different lengths. We provide an example of 
the EU, which in connection with the 1992 CAP-reform changed its policy-making process 
from holding annual meetings to holding meetings only once every several years. This example 
may support our theory that predicts the positive relationship ceteris paribus between 
negotiation costs and the length of a policy reform. The theory also contributes to the long-  12 
standing debate on whether government redistribution is efficient. Policy analysis that does not 
take into account the dynamics of policy timing may run the risk of finding potentially efficient 
policies to be inefficient.  
The theory of policy timing presented suggests several potentially valuable extensions. We 
only incorporate negotiation costs into the model. Introducing additional sources of transaction 
costs (like the implementation, administration and enforcement costs of policies) is expected to 
strengthen the impacts of those transaction costs already incorporated in the model. Therefore 
we would expect governments to wait even longer until new comprehensive policy reforms are 
introduced (“reactive governance”).  
We model the policy-decision making process as a one-dimensional objective: The 
weighted sum of interest group welfare net of the costs of “running the system”. An interesting 
extension would be to model the governance structure of policy making in more detail and 
relate it to other types of transaction costs (like asset specificity) (Dixit 1996). Of course we do 
not claim that our negotiation cost function covers the complexity of EU agricultural policy 
making, but we acknowledge the costliness of decision-making through the inclusion of 
negotiation costs. The collection of empirical data to specify different kinds of transaction costs 
and their incorporation in a mathematical model of the kind provided in this study, constitutes, 
in this respect, an important venue for future work. Extending the political part of the model in 
this way, and extending the economic part of the model by introducing various input and 
output markets would be expected to yield new insights into the relationships between the 
causes of (agricultural) policies (derived from the political part of the model) and the 
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